Some Preliminary Conclusions (March 8, 2022)
First, Ukrainians’ resentment towards Russia will shape any future resolution of the war. The population of some areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk, now self-proclaimed independent nations, seem to be the exception. Otherwise, the invaders have no support from the civilian population, even among ethnic Russians. There is, therefore, no room for “regime change” in Kiev.
Second, the invasion is proceeding slower than most observers expected, however, we don’t know whether or not that was the original plan. Let’s not forget that during the invasion of Iraq it took the US army twenty days to enter Bagdad even though it was preceded by heavy aerial attacks famously known as “Shock and Awe.” My impression is that Russia initiated the invasion with some self-restraint probably to minimize opposition. Now their attacks are becoming more deadly. According to the UN, the number of civilians killed by March 7th, 2022[1] reached 408 people. The actual number may be much higher. This is a real tragedy. The number of people killed after 10 days of war in Iraq, is by most accounts much higher[2]. This may illustrate two different strategies for defeating opposing armies.
Third, the reaction to the Russian invasion has strengthened NATO and the US. Military budgets in Europe are on the rise. The west is practically unified in condemning the invasion. In some respects, the invasion provided the US and NATO a kind of “renewal,” at least for some time. Needles to say, the military-industrial complex is a big winner.
Fourth, after thirteen days of fighting, negotiations between Russia and Ukraine haven’t achieved much. In the end, it seems Ukraine will concede to Russia’s primary demand: no membership in NATO. Demands by either side, however, may change in response to the realities on the ground, including the internal situation in Russia.
Fifth, sanctions will hurt the Russian economy. Will they change Putin’s mind? History tells us it’s unlikely. Even if the Russian government is replaced, new leaders may insist that Ukraine be neutral. Europe will also suffer from the sanctions while bearing the burden of millions refugees leaving Ukraine. Inflation in the US may accelerate particularly in relation to food and energy. The world in general will also suffer from price increases. The economic recovery may slow. Incumbent governments, including in the US, will feel the political impact of these events.
Sixth, the US and Europe are backing the Ukrainian fight against Russia by supplying arms, and probably volunteers. This support is unlikely to change the outcome; it may only delay it. Therefore, this is the key question: Should the major powers’ strategy be to pressure for negotiations to end the conflict? Or should they continue to provide support that prolongs it? The latter will be costly for the Ukrainian population and for Russia.
Seventh, Russia has been cracking down on anti-war demonstrators and has introduced a kind of martial law to keep them in jail. (Martial law exists in most countries but is usually only applied when a formal declaration of war takes place). Should demonstrations grow, they could pose a major risk to Putin’s government. Scattered evidence suggests, however, that a majority of Russians support the invasion as necessary to protect their country from existential threat. The discourse in the west, on the other hand, has been quite uniform. The majority of people repudiate the invasion. The media, it must be recognized, has not given any voice to dissenting views. The prevailing demonization of Putin is the center of the political discourse. Putin’s demonization has been a substitute for true discussion of policies.
Eighth, repudiation of the invasion should not prevent us from recognizing Russia’s legitimate security concerns. Those concerns include Ukraine potentially joining NATO and receiving lethal weapons. (This supplying of lethal weapons has taken place since the Trump administration.) Preventive wars are not legal, the invasion of Iraq and the bombing of Libya included. The media has ostensibly avoided any reference to these examples while discussing Russian actions in Ukraine.
Ninth, inflation of energy and food products will affect China negatively but we don’t know by how much. In other respects, China may not suffer, but rather benefit. Strengthened US and NATO do not favor China geopolitically, but the country is (commercially) trusted and has been predictable in its policies. So its economic expansion will continue. Besides, the US will be too busy with Russia to pivot to Asia for some time.
[1] CNN, March 7, 2022 https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-07-22/h_7c849b7738d7d461e842b1b9a4d0f855
[2] Iraq War, Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War