Why are unrests spreading in emerging economies? It was Turkey some days ago. Now it is Brazil. In 2011, Tunisia, not quite an emerging economy but, in many respects, a successful one, also witnessed a protest movement that spread beyond its borders giving birth to what we call the Arab spring.
These countries have similar per capita incomes: Tunisia and Turkey around US$ 10,000; Brazil somewhat higher, US$ 12,000. Their economies had been expanding steadily. Brazil is now the sixth largest economy in the world. The three countries are considered upper middle-income countries. These countries have reduced absolute poverty in the last ten years, particularly Brazil. Inequality is relatively low in Tunisia. It is still high in Brazil although important progress has been made. Turkey had been reducing inequality for several years but modest, if any progress seems to have taken place in more recent years. Social expenditures have been important tools of their policies against poverty, particularly in Brazil; less so in Turkey. Governance is weak but not shockingly weak in neither of these cases. Corruption may have even declined, however, a more informed and educated population is more aware of the influence of corruption in public policies.
However, the economic success of these economies has been accompanied by hidden losses suffered by “entrants” to the system. Dealing with increasingly complex government regulations is part of the modernization experienced by these countries. Young people suffer more than others from these increased complex rules which are usually circumvented by the powerful members of the society. Public spaces are shrinking. Those are spaces that the youth values particularly high. Playing football (soccer is a misnomer) is not easy as it used to be in the cities. Increasingly, it is just for overpaid stars or for people who can afford elevated fees in private clubs or football schools. As the cities expand, transportation costs represent increasing share of the people’s budgets and time. Protestors may have benefitted from the economic progress but they are aware of the gaps that separate them from the ones that hold power in society. In fact, new entrants bear the cost of progress to a large degree.
The sparks of the crisis present interesting similarities. In Tunisia, it was a vendor harassed by the authorities. In Turkey, it was the defense of a public space. More recently in Brazil, the protest erupted because of an increase in bus fares. As protests take shape, the use of public resources as a whole is questioned. In most cases, protesters turn to the issue of governance and corruption, the crucial topics of our time in practically every country.
The protestors are usually young, disenchanted and urban. The means of communication among protesters is electronic. These people are not politically organized. They do not have a political agenda, at least initially. They distrust the establishment (that is the ones that hold power or are benefitting from it). They dislike the “children of the power”; those that can inhale cocaine without any problem while the less powerful would spend time in jailed for few grams of marihuana.
Popular demonstrations in Brazil, in Turkey or, as before, in Tunisia, should have not been so surprising. In Tunisia the demonstrations resulted in a major crisis that led to the democratization of the country (albeit the process is not fully consolidated). Demonstrations in Turkey and Brazil are still ongoing and their outcomes are not clear at this stage. They may produce some political adjustments but, unlikely, major political changes in the existing democratic systems.
This kind of events may well be repeated in China, India and other societies. In South America, unrests may reach Chile or Argentina. They could also reach developed countries where vast segments of the youth feel alienated.