We do not know when or how this war will end. However, several trends are already emerging as a result of it. These will likely shape the situation once the war concludes.

First, countries may think twice before assuming that negotiations with the United States can resolve their differences. The United States and Israel initiated the attack while negotiations were still taking place. It has been described as an unprovoked attack, positioning both as aggressors. It seems that a declining power may rely more on force and even assassination as tools to project power and resolve conflicts.

Second, unfortunately the United States has lost credibility in adhering to previous agreements. Under Trump, the U.S. withdrew from several international agreements: notably with Iran, with Cuba, and with various international organizations. A country that lacks continuity in its commitments, pressures both competitors and allies, and is quick to use military force risks being seen as unreliable. This perception goes beyond any particular administration. In long-term agreements, the international community cannot depend on internal political cycles.

Third, underlying the perceived decline in (relative) U.S. power, there are internal challenges that have worsened in recent years. Worsening income inequality has affected large segments of the population. Access to healthcare, education, and housing is becoming increasingly difficult for younger generations. There are also institutional weaknesses, structural in nature but more visible in recent years. For example, the government struggles to pass a budget on time; additional expenditures are frequently requested from Congress to accommodate changing policies in the context of large deficits; repeated debt ceiling crises have led to government shutdowns; there are concerns about the executive branch disregarding judicial rulings; and harsh and controversial immigration enforcement practices persist. Several deaths have resulted from such enforcement. Public debt has reached levels many consider increasingly unsustainable. The list goes on.

Fourth, the United States no longer has the largest industrial sector, nor is it the leading global trading power. In both respects, China has surpassed it. While the U.S. retains an edge in technological development, the gap continues to narrow, and in some areas China has already surpassed it. Measured by purchasing power parity, China’s economy is larger than that of the United States. China is often viewed as more consistent in respecting international agreements and maintains relatively few military bases abroad. By contrast, the United States operates hundreds, some reportedly against the will of host countries. A powerful military, partly sustained by external debt, and the widespread use of the dollar as a reserve currency, albeit in gradual decline, remain central pillars of U.S. power.

Fifth, the presence of U.S. military bases in Gulf countries made them targets in the current conflict with Iran. While these bases are intended to provide security—and are often financed by host nations—they have increased those countries’ exposure to attack. It would not be surprising if Gulf states reassess the value of hosting such bases, although the United States would likely resist any significant change.

Sixth, the situation in the Middle East will likely change after the war. Iran may be weakened in the short term. However, unless there is a major political transformation, it is likely to focus on rebuilding its military capabilities and, potentially, pursuing nuclear weapons as a deterrent against future attacks. Historically, countries without nuclear capabilities—or those that abandoned them, such as Libya—have been vulnerable, while nuclear-armed states like North Korea have avoided direct attacks. Israel, itself a nuclear power, may face increasing isolation. It is re-occupying part of Lebanon, which could create a new and enduring source of conflict.

Seventh, due in part to opposition to its internal, repressive political system, Iran is often blamed for a wide range of global problems. This portrayal may be exaggerated and shaped by political narratives. There is little evidence to suggest that Iran would act irrationally—for example, by launching a nuclear attack against Israel—even if it were to acquire such capabilities, which is not a desirable outcome. Much attention is given to so-called “Iranian proxies” in the Middle East, such as Hezbollah. However, Hezbollah is also a political organization that emerged in response to Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon (1982–2000), during which thousands of Lebanese were killed. It is a Shiite-based group with representation in parliament as well as a military wing. While it receives support from Iran, it operates with its own interests and internal dynamics. A similar situation applies to Hamas, which receives support from Iran and Qatar but maintains its own independent agenda. Hamas is a Sunni, non-secular organization.

Eighth, Iran is frequently accused of supporting terrorism. However, the definition and application of this term are often contested. Over the past two to three decades, there are not conclusive evidence directly linking Iran to major international terrorist attacks. For instance, the bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa in the 1990s (in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya) were carried out by Al-Qaeda, a Sunni extremist group opposed to Iran and initially funded by the US. Attacks to the Israeli embassy and a Jewish center  in Buenos Aires, Argentina, during the same decade were widely attributed to Iran, though proof remains disputed. Some investigations have raised doubts about Iran’s direct involvement. Notably, Iran has maintained longstanding diplomatic and commercial relations with Argentina.