Introduction: The U.S. attacked Venezuela. Before that, it bombed several boats, killing more than a hundred people. It captured oil tankers and kidnapped Maduro. It is said that 150 aircraft were used for this. Nearly a hundred people died in the kidnapping operation. A significant portion of U.S. naval-military power is assigned to these actions.

The U.S. is nevertheless a declining power that wants to project its unmatched military power aggressively, particularly in Latin America. It shows itself as a victorious in the short term but sacrifices the rest of its credibility. It seems isolated in the international context. Europe is marginalized; China is the leading industrial and commercial power and disputes technological leadership in some fields; India is rising in economic and political importance. Russia, contrary to all predictions, emerges strong despite the war and sanctions. Furthermore, the internal situation in the U.S. is becoming complicated: the repression launched against minorities meets resistance and caused already some deaths, the cost of healthcare and housing worsens, and the prices of food and services remains high. Trump’s crude language is very offensive inside and outside the U.S., even if it does not imply too much difference from the practices followed by many of his predecessors. Simply put, the Emperor has no clothes.

The political situation has changed in Venezuela. What happens from here on will depend on what occurs with its main actors: the government of Delcy Rodriguez, Trump, Russia, China, and, with less relevance at least for now, the countries of Latin America. Rodriguez and Trump need each other. Although under an existential threat, Rodriguez can leverage her ability to bring stability and improve internal conditions. Trump will impose conditions, but he knows he has limits if he does not want to preside over unmanageable instability in Venezuela that could spill over to other countries and further complicate his internal situation. This is just the beginning.

Delcy Rodriguez: The Venezuelan Government negotiates with a gun to its head. I believe it does so in the conviction that the U.S. wants stability in Venezuela and calculates that, for now, only its government is in a position to offer it. Delcy Rodriguez comes from a revolutionary tradition, which provides her with legitimacy before the hardliners.  Additionally, she is responsible for a significant economic recovery in recent times. It is reported that the economy grew by more than 5% in 2024; results for 2025 were not estimated, although some sources estimated it as positive at the beginning, declining toward the end of the year due to U.S. sanctions and political uncertainty. Inflation declined to 48% in 2024 after a period of hyperinflation. It accelerated in 2025, however. The dollar is widely used in most transactions. Oil production, central to the economy and exports, practically collapsed to only 500,000 barrels per day in 2020. It climbed to one million barrels per day at present. This increase is associated with Rodriguez’s management as Vice President and Minister of Oil. I suspect this allowed her to develop good relations with Chevron, the only U.S. company authorized to operate in Venezuela so far. 

Trump: The Trump government wants to show achievements at a low cost. He surely has the November congressional elections in sight. Trump is brutally frank in confessing his objective of ruling Venezuela and taking its oil (he already announced that the U.S. would take and sell two months of production per year to be divided between the U.S. and Venezuela; details are not known). He does not want to use troops inside Venezuela, mindful of the very bad U.S. experiences when it did so. But threats and bombings have limited value when there are no troops inside. I believe Delcy Rodriguez is aware that this situation favors her in future negotiations with Trump, provided she consolidates and improves the economic situation somewhat. A difficult path, but not impossible for both.

Emboldened by the success of the bombing of Venezuela and the kidnapping of Maduro, Trump threatens other countries: Colombia, Cuba, Greenland, Iran, Mexico. I believe, however, that he will time his moves very carefully. If he overreaches, his power weakens. Of all these threats, two seem more serious: Iran and Cuba. In Iran, the intention would be a “touch and go” jointly with Israel, like last time. If he takes Cuba, that could be his crowning achievement before the congressional elections, whose projections are currently unfavorable to him. The Cuban economy is in real trouble because of the lack of energy. It is in danger of collapsing. It is what Trump, and particularly Rubio, desire in order to act. There is also much talk about the U.S. desire to take and annex Greenland. I assume they will force an agreement to control the place, but I doubt—without ruling it out—that they will take the island without an agreement with Denmark, to which Greenland belongs. Otherwise, it would be the end of NATO as we know it. Trump wants Greenland not so much for security, as he says. He already has a military base there and can surely strengthen it. His interest in the place is the exploitation of rare earths, minerals, and I suppose also oil and gas. Subjecting Greenland to such exploitation would be very detrimental for the environment: the resulting acceleration of ice-melting could raise ocean waters dangerously.

China: China may appear as a loser in the first instance. It would not buy Venezuelan oil as before, or would do so on a smaller scale, and would sell fewer of its products since the U.S. would impose its own. But after a while, and if Venezuelan oil production continues its recovery, it cannot be ruled out that China resumes purchases. If China stops buying from Venezuela, it is most likely to increase its purchases from Russia. Will that be convenient to the US? Furthermore, China produces goods that the U.S. does not produce and is the one who sells them at the best price. China favors the diplomatic path and will avoid getting involved in dangerous confrontations. It prefers to continue selling and investing in the world. Additionally, China monopolizes more than 90% of the refining of rare minerals. The U.S. depends for now on China for those minerals crucial in technological products and the military industry. Moreover, China holds U.S. Treasury Bonds for around 800 billion, or 12% of the total. It has been divesting from them gradually, but if China sells the TB at once, it could crash the values of them with the consequent damage to the North American and world economy. China cannot compite with  the U.S. in military power, but its economic muscle when negotiating has a considerable reach.

Russia: In my estimation, Russia will not make major efforts to recover its influence in Venezuela. But it will take advantage of the situation and focus on the war in Ukraine imposing its conditions in the presence of a debilitated Europe. Russia is now an important regional power.

Latin America: I do not believe that Latin American countries can or want to do much. Maduro’s discredit complicates any defense of Venezuela. Besides, there is a shift to the right in many countries, at least in many of their respective governments (Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, the incoming government of Chile, Peru, El Salvador, Honduras). Countries with progressive governments (Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay) have limited themselves to rhetorical or diplomatic protests. Colombia took a more militant position initially. Petro can show significant progress in the seizure of cocaine. Although it goes without saying: the production and trafficking of narcotics has nothing to do with all of this.